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Carers’ responses to shifting identity in dementia in Iris and Away From Her: 
cultivating stability or embracing change? 
 
ABSTRACT  
An emphasis on supporting and maintaining self-identity in dementia for as long as possible 
has gone hand in hand with the revitalisation of interventions, services and empowerment for 
people with dementia. However, recognition of the need for change, adaptation and personal 
growth is as necessary when living with dementia as at any other time in people’s lives. 
Those who care for people with dementia must constantly navigate this tension between 
continuity and change within the context of memory loss, knowing when to respond by 
reinforcing the ‘self’ they have known over time, and when it may be better to respond by 
acknowledging the changes that have taken place. The creative arts are avenues for the 
exploration of the caring relationship under these conditions, conveying the challenges and 
stimulating audiences to ask themselves how they might choose to respond in a similar 
situation. This article considers how the scenarios of two noted films, Iris (dir. Richard Eyre, 
2001 UK) and Away From Her (dir. Sarah Polley, 2006 Can), present the dilemmas of 
identity and care. In both, a husband cares for a wife experiencing cognitive decline, but 
responds differently in each to her shifting needs and changes in identity. We argue that the 
two films reveal complementary and provocative perspectives on this situation, and, though 
they offer no easy answers, provide insights into the dilemmas and decisions characteristic of 
caring for someone who has dementia.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
Explaining her reasons for writing about her mother’s dementia in 1998, Linda Grant 
commented on ‘a silence, a taboo,’ which meant that 
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the meteor of dementia that strikes families and wipes out so much is supposed to be 
part of the realm of privacy. What you don’t talk about. What you keep to yourself.1  
If this was once the case, proliferating representations of the dementia experience have done 
much to break that silence over the intervening period. The creative arts, notably literature2 
and cinema3, have played a significant role in exploring what it is like for carers to see a 
family member go through dementia. This article discusses how two noted films address the 
relationship between a wife who develops Alzheimer’s Disease and a husband who must 
adjust to the change, raising questions about the continuity of personal identity as memory 
and recognition fade, and about the role of loved ones in relation to that continuity.  
  
The films in question, Iris and Away From Her (AFH) are only two among a range of 
cinematic treatments of dementia.4 Yet we have chosen to concentrate on this pair because to 
date Iris and AFH remain the only English-language films to have achieved mainstream 
commercial success where dementia, and its direct effects on relationships, are the very core 
of the work’s subject matter.i While in other works it serves as a narrative device (e.g., The 
Notebook, dir. Nick Cassavete, 2004 US) or is treated as one among other major themes (e.g., 
The Iron Lady, dir. Phyllida Lloyd, 2011 UK), both Iris and AFH treat the challenges, 
dilemmas and even joys of living with dementia as their central focus. In depicting the 
extraordinary but everyday situations facing carers and people with dementia, these films 
engage viewers with the question of how the carers might suitably respond to the inexorable 
decline of memory and the slow fading of a couple’s shared history together. Both films are 
adaptations, but their distinctive visual and aural modes of immersion involve and challenge 
audiences in ways that differ from their original written source material and that merit study, 
both in conjunction with those texts and in their own right.5 Doing so makes it possible to 
                                                 
i Since this article was first prepared, Still Alice (2014 US, dir. Wash Westmoreland / Richard Glatzer) has been 
released and also falls into this category.  
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analyse how the cinematic drama enables viewers to explore existential issues that dementia 
throws into sharp relief. This article specifically considers the ways in which the films’ 
caregivers try to respond to one of the key challenges that dementia poses: at what points to 
try to preserve continuity in aspects of the self in the person with dementia, and by contrast 
when to recognise and facilitate shifts in that person’s identity and self.   
 
DEMENTIA, IDENTITY AND RESPONDING TO CHANGE 
Consisting of a family of conditions, of which Alzheimer’s Disease is the best known, 
dementia’s defining feature is progressive, irreversible deterioration in selective areas of 
brain functioning. Though only one symptom among many over the course of the disease, 
memory loss is the characteristic that is most notorious, arguably because of the fundamental 
role that remembering plays in contemporary Western thinking about the constitution of 
personal identity and the self. In this vein, an influential intellectual tradition, of which 
seventeenth-century thinker John Locke is the classic exponent, argues that identity is 
founded on a human being’s continuous self-consciousness – that is: memory and awareness 
of oneself as an uninterrupted, internally consistent sentience. By implication, an individual’s 
very personhood and selfhood are destroyed by dementia and its effects on recall.6 However, 
as social and psychological theory have shown, identity consists of more than just a personal, 
individualised aspect. Self-identity is in part defined, or at least influenced, by how 
individuals present to others and how those others, in turn, respond. This is the aspect of self 
that can be thought of as ‘social identity’.7-8 This approach to the constitution of self-identity, 
through the interplay between individuals’ self-presentation and what those around them 
reflect back in response, has been influential in dementia studies. Landmark research by Tom 
Kitwood – who showed how repeated ‘de-personalising’ interactions with people who have 
dementia can be at least as disabling as the condition itself9 – and Steven Sabat – who 
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focused closely on the damaging effects that negative symbolic, social and discursive 
practices have on selfhood and self-worth in dementia10 – made clear the extent to which 
other people’s validation can affect the individual’s sense of self, already under siege from 
the effects of the condition. Their findings have inspired a prolific stream of literature 
drawing attention to the many ways in which the self can be undermined in dementia and 
proposing how it might instead be preserved.11-12 
 
This approach has produced enormous benefits by raising awareness of the ongoing 
personhood and potential of people with dementia. However, it is also worth asking – as 
Sarah Lamb13 does with regard to the ‘successful aging’ movement – whether there can ever 
be downsides to the emphasis on preservation of self. Lamb identifies the notion of 
“permanent personhood” contained within ‘successful aging’ discourse, and questions 
whether the weight placed on prolonging independence and “declining to decline” 
discourages people from coming to terms with the shadows of these aspects of life: 
interdependence, transience and impairment. She asks whether, despite the inspirational 
benefits of the model, it may set people up for failure by inculcating unrealistic expectations 
and concealing the meaningfulness that can be found in age-related changes, or ‘decline.’ The 
notion of “permanent personhood” can be identified as a driver behind dementia studies such 
as the ones referred to above. Though any aspiration towards ‘permanence’ is always 
attenuated by the well-known relentlessness of decline in dementia, the aim remains to stave 
off as much change as possible for as long as possible. 
 
Indeed, it is hard to object to this. Most of us deeply fear the dissolution of our identity and 
are repelled by the idea of becoming someone unrecognisable. Fundamental and 
commonplace ideas of ‘health’ that inform biomedicine and society alike rest on saving and 
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preserving function, so that any changes produced by dementia are liable to be seen as 
‘deterioration.’ And often one of the most difficult aspects of dementia for relatives to cope 
with is to find oneself suddenly a stranger, as though years of a shared past had been wiped 
away. Responding to these considerations, the instinct of family is commonly to do whatever 
they can to maintain the person with dementia as the self that they have known. Yet, as Clive 
Baldwin points out, change as well as continuity is necessary in the lives of people with 
dementia, just as for all of us.14 Some take an even stronger view, claiming that  
decisions affecting a demented person at a given time must speak to the person's point 
of view as current at that time. Heeding values and wishes that the patient no longer 
espouses and that cannot be said to represent her present needs and interests can do no 
good for the patient.15  
Despite the fact that the need for change and development – whether positive or not – is 
widely accepted in everyday living, in dementia binary notions of ‘preservation vs. loss’ may 
all too easily prevail over more nuanced views of ‘preservation vs. change’, eclipsing 
alternative perspectives that seek to highlight the value that life retains even when we – in 
various different ways – “forget memory.”16-18  
 
While such debates about the continuity of selfhood may seem to be primarily abstract 
philosophical questions, they actually throw into sharp focus dilemmas that present 
themselves to carers on a regular basis, as immediate and specific demands to respond in one 
way or another to the person before them. At what moments is it better to do so by 
reaffirming the person that they have known for so long, and when might it be better instead 
to acknowledge and validate transformations in the self, brought about – at least in part – by 
Alzheimer’s? Iris and AFH each dramatises this choice and its impact on the people involved 
slightly differently. In Iris, Iris’ professional and intellectual identity as a writer undergo 
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profound shifts, to which her husband mostly reacts by struggling doggedly to maintain 
continuity in the face of the changes wrought by the dementia. In AFH, it is the relational 
aspect of identity that is brought centre-stage, and the husband ultimately responds with 
considerable flexibility. The contrasts should not be overdrawn; all caring relationships are 
invariably multidimensional and involve some degree of both change and continuity, so these 
characterisations are far from absolute. Moreover, some of the dissimilarities stem from the 
different stages of dementia that Iris and Fiona reach; while Iris’ decline is charted to the final 
stages leading up to her death, Fiona is less starkly affected in the course of the film, leading 
to different kinds of change and placing different demands upon their respective husbands.  
Yet comparison between the two is instructive for the empathic insights it affords into the 
experience of deciding how far to honour an identity that is facing unprecedented challenges, 
and how far to adjust to the changes taking place. Neither film offers answers, but the 
questions raised invite audiences to consider how they themselves might deal with similar 
instances of ambivalence between flux and stability. 
 
THE FILMS 
Iris tells of the writer and philosopher Iris Murdoch, ranging through a sequence of 
biographical episodes from both her earlier life and the much later period when her dementia 
became manifest. Switching back and forth between these two timelines, one narrative 
introduces us to Iris’ younger self and charts the unfolding of her courtship with John, while 
the other tracks the growing encroachment of Alzheimer’s Disease into their life together. As 
the younger John gradually overcomes his initial awkwardness, jealousies and insecurity over 
Iris’ bohemian lifestyle, the older John finds it increasingly hard to cope with the strain of 




AFH tells the story of Grant, whose wife Fiona’s dementia causes her to enter residential 
care. Once there, she no longer recognises Grant, but develops a close relationship with 
another resident, Aubrey, and becomes deeply depressed when he returns home. Grant, 
desperate to prevent Fiona’s rapid physical and mental decline, pleads with Aubrey’s wife, 
Marian, to allow him to return. It is only by starting an affair with Marian that he eventually 
convinces her to do so. However, at the moment when he brings Aubrey back to see Fiona, 
she seems to have miraculously recovered, recognising Grant and lovingly validating his 
ongoing concern for her.  
 
A key difference between the two films is genre. Iris’ source material is the memoir by her 
husband John Bayley.19 AFH, by contrast, is adapted from a fictional short story, ‘The Bear 
Came Over the Mountain’ by the Nobel Prize-winning Canadian author, Alice Munro.20 
Although adapted works should perhaps be considered and critiqued on their own merits, it is 
worth noting that their different origins in life writing and fiction, respectively, influence both 
how the films were constructed and how they were received by audiences. With regard to the 
themes the films explore, it may be that dealing in fiction gives Polley (and Munro) ethical 
freedom to delve into questions of relationships and sexual faithfulness with fewer qualms 
than Eyre (although he does not shy away from portraying such matters for the younger Iris). 
Less speculatively, much of Iris’ audience comes to the film with expectations already 
formed from some degree of prior knowledge of Iris Murdoch as a public figure, evidence of 
which is found in some of the sharp criticisms the film received for not sufficiently 
foregrounding Iris’ real accomplishments.21 The past life of the fictional character Fiona, by 
contrast, is in many respects a cipher about which only small, though significant, hints are 
given; this is one reason why the film has received praise for emphasising the value to be 
found in living in the present with dementia, rather than comparing with the past16.  
8 
 
Contending neither with the ethical responsibility of memoirists to the person they are 
representing and to the historical record22, nor with audience reception of the work shaped by 
these considerations, AFH has more scope than Iris to emphasise flexibility of relationships. 
By contrast, Bayley’s memoir was subject to attack on the grounds that some of the decisions 
he made about what to disclose about Murdoch’s life demeaned her dignity23, and inadvertent 
misrepresentation is another ever-present risk in writing about the illness experiences of those 
who can no longer represent themselves.24 Awareness of this perhaps informs the repeated 
acknowledgement in Iris of how difficult it is for even John to be confident of really knowing 
her fully [e.g., 50:55, 1:08:43].  
 
 
CHANGING SELVES AND CARER RESPONSES 
Both films, alongside much dementia-themed mainstream cinema, have been criticised for 
the focus on carer experience and the relative marginalisation of the person with dementia.25-
28 Certainly, it is noteworthy that the climactic moment in each film centres on the woman 
with dementia granting a form of absolution to her husband, as Iris tells John that she loves 
him (implicitly in spite of the times when he has lost his temper with her) and Fiona tells 
Grant that he is a good man for persisting in trying to make her happy (implicitly despite his 
affair in the past); hence the plot structures, in remarkably parallel approaches, resolve with 
the person with dementia offering redemption to the carer. The key point of narrative 
resolution comes when the carers have their struggles to perform their changing roles 
apparently validated, thereby foregrounding this process as a key plot thread. Furthermore, 
John’s experiences of learning about and trying to understand Iris are the film’s main focus, 
while the younger Iris’ own emotional life apart from him is left comparatively unexplored. 
Even more markedly, AFH predominantly adopts Grant’s perspective in his quest to know 
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how to respond to the changes in Fiona; the camera rarely adopts Fiona’s perspective 
[01:25:25]. However, that they spotlight the carer’s experience of Alzheimer’s Disease need 
not be seen as a problem inherent to these films themselves; rather, it becomes a problem in 
the context of how dominant this approach is in cinema overall, and how scarce the voices of 
people with dementia have been as a result.  
 
In themselves, the perspectives of carers are a fully legitimate subject for cinematic treatment 
and exploration, with the potential for rich insights into how they may respond to the often 
intense dilemmas and pressures they face.29-30 Iris and AFH can be read as the two husbands’ 
explorations of the shifting nature of their relationships as, having been thrust into the caring 
role, they attempt to navigate the changes they see in their wives. The specific dilemma that 
is the focus of this article relates to what the clinical literature discusses as “supporting the 
self,”12 and the role that the carer can and should attempt to play in it. This is not to suggest 
that there is not rich material for analysis on how the women themselves navigate their 
changing relationships, or for that matter, on other ways in which John and Grant negotiate 
the role reversals and shifting power dynamics that they are experiencing; indeed, far more 
could be discussed than there is scope for in this article, and the critical literature has already 
tackled some of these issues21, 26, 31. This article’s contribution therefore focuses on what 
messages the films convey about the conscious strategies adopted by the two men in seeking 
to facilitate the well-being of their wives, either by accepting or rejecting changes in the 
latter’s selfhood. In portraying the effects of their strategies on the two women, the films 
invite viewers to wonder how things might have gone if different approaches had been tried, 
potentially stimulating nuanced reflections on change and continuity in dementia.  
 
“Such things you wrote!”: Iris and the Dissolution of Writerhood 
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In Iris, John’s struggle to know and understand Iris begins long before the onset of dementia. 
From wondering about the relationships she has with her other friends and lovers, to musing 
on the “unknown and mysterious world” [50:55] into which she disappears when writing, the 
younger John is at times equally as perplexed about understanding her as he becomes later, 
when Alzheimer’s Disease has taken hold. The younger Iris herself comments on this, 
comparing herself to Proteus, the shape-changing Greek sea-god [1:02:00]. Just as Hercules 
kept hold of Proteus as he took on the forms of lion, fish and snake, so she urges John to keep 
hold of her no matter what facets of her ‘self’ and identity come to the fore, an instruction 
that resonates later as dementia’s changes become manifest. Soon after, she reiterates this 
advice when John complains that he knows so little about her life: “You must accept me as I 
am[…]Just keep tight hold of me and it’ll be alright” [1:07:23]. Cutting back and forth 
between youth and later life, the film underscores the limits of how well we can get to know 
another’s inner self by strategically juxtaposing this scene with the older John shouting at 
Iris: “I’ve never known anything about you at all and now I don’t care” [1:08:43], and then 
with the younger Iris telling him that “You know more about me than anyone on Earth” 
[1:11:02]. This sequence more than any other emphasises that there is no direct access that 
enables even a close lover to know, define, and fix in place another individual’s identity, as 
John seems to feel the urge to do; meta-textually, it serves as a reminder of the inescapable 
ambiguity of both memoir and adaptation.  
 
The dilemmas are further sharpened for John once Iris starts to dement. It is clearly important 
to him to maintain her identity as a writer. Iris herself is rarely heard commenting on the issue 
of the changes in her identity. One exception comes when John declares to the doctor that 
“Words have meant everything to her” [30:57], to which Iris adds that “It frightens me and 
then sometimes it doesn’t frighten me, and that’s worse, because that’s it winning, isn’t it?” 
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But, with the exception of one early scene [29:29], the film overall does not present Iris 
herself as profoundly troubled by the loss of her authorial capabilities; instead, it is John who 
struggles to accept that the talents he has so admired may no longer be accessible. The first 
time that he loses his temper with her is when she does not register the significance of her 
newly-published book [33:23]. Rather, she is preoccupied with repeating the phrase “Only 
the postman,” having found herself unable to find the correct word for him when he showed 
up to deliver it. Her new book, apart from the moment when John first shows it to her, is 
never really foregrounded in the mise en scène and is given scant attention by Iris, signifying 
the gradual dissolution of her identity as a writer. Because of the excitement that he had 
anticipated the book’s arrival would spark for her, John is not able to adjust to her immediate 
and greater concern of losing her memory of words. By contrast, his delight is palpable when 
she later unexpectedly remembers that “I … wrote” [45:26]. Viewers may wonder who truly 
benefits from the attempt to maintain her identity as a writer.  
 
When John and Iris visit their friend Janet at her beach-house, John does all he can to ensure 
that Iris keeps writing: “Just talk to her – say things to her that she can write. She can, you 
know” [49:03]. Iris, however, sits by herself on the shore, peers at her biro, and pulls the 
blank pages out of her notebook, weighing them down with pebbles so they do not fly away. 
Though Janet, with John’s encouragement, asks Iris to sign a copy of her book, Iris throws 
the pen and volume away, apparently unable to work out what is expected or unwilling to 
attempt it [53:30]. She abruptly snatches away each of the pebbles acting as paperweights and 
the notebook pages flutter away on the wind. We do not see Iris try to write again in the film; 
the discarding of the pebbles represents a milestone in the changes in her identity and 
relationship to her past self32. The camera then cuts to Janet soaping Iris’ back in the shower 
and Iris laughing delightedly. She calls Janet an angel and later finds reassurance in dancing 
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with her. The mise en scène emphasises contrast: in the beach scene, the color theme is a 
melancholic, distancing greyish-blue, and Iris is shown mostly as physically isolated and with 
her back to her friends and husband; the shower scene, on the other hand, depicts a warmer 
yellow theme, and Iris is shown in happy and intimate physical contact with Janet. It is 
difficult to escape the question here of whether the attempts to maintain her selfhood as a 
‘writer’ are actually beneficial to her, or whether Janet’s physical contact and communication 
with Iris do more for her well-being in the moment. Iris’ presentation of embodiment has 
been interpreted both positively and negatively: as a way of attempting to encourage viewer 
identification with Iris and move beyond the objectification of dementia28; and as a post-
feminist, patriarchal way of “systematically reduc[ing her] to her body”.21 Yet these critics do 
not acknowledge the importance afforded to embodiment as an integral element of selfhood 
(both for men and women) in recent dementia theory.18, 33  By the way in which it highlights 
the body here, the film invites viewers to ask whether John’s tendency to privilege the 
intellectual aspects of Iris’ identity, epitomised in the nostalgic wonderment with which he 
exclaims “Such things you wrote!”[46:30], may at times, although done with the best of 
intentions, do more harm than good.  
 
In the book from which the film is adapted, John Bayley wrestles more explicitly with these 
questions.19 Noting that his attempts to read to Iris were “not a success” (p. 45), he speculates 
about this activity being “a reminder of the loss of identity” (p. 46). Musing that Iris herself 
had said that she never really understood what it was to feel a sense of identity, he ponders 
whether this might have made the process of dementia easier for her (p. 47). He too has 
moments where he finds it difficult to remember that Iris might once have been different (p. 
51). Although it may seem an ironic term to use in dementia (literally, ‘de-’ or ‘un-minding’), 
his experience has taught him that the most successful approach is a form of ‘mindfulness.’ 
13 
 
“Being in the present moment,” rather than responding primarily to the pressures of 
maintaining continuity in Iris’ self, emerges as the most promising way for him to interact 
with her, while the film depicts the strains that result from doing otherwise. In this Bayley’s 
experience echoes that of other advocates of mindfulness within the medical humanities.34  
 
“Some who accept what comes their way”: Accepting Change in Away From Her  
Unlike Iris, AFH has its origins in fiction and is unconstrained by the boundaries of ‘what 
really happened’ within an individual’s recollections. As such, it addresses head-on questions 
of continuity and change in relationships by presenting Grant with a sharp dilemma. While 
Iris’s past lovers are very much in John’s mind at several points, Fiona’s real and immediate 
attraction to Aubrey becomes evident before Grant’s very eyes. Should he try to keep her as 
who she was, or should he accept and be guided by her preferences in the present? There are 
moments when Grant attempts to assert Fiona’s previous self (for example, complaining that 
she is wearing someone else’s sweater: “No, it’s not pretty, it’s tacky. She would never wear 
something like that!” [59:40]), but, in contrast to John’s approach in Iris, he soon decides that 
the best course is to let Fiona change. He doesn’t interfere with her activity in the centre, but 
visits daily to watch her and sometimes to converse. When Aubrey leaves and Fiona despairs, 
Grant actively tries to bring them back together, judging that the only way to ensure Fiona’s 
well-being is to efface their own married relationship and facilitate her in forging a new one. 
Ironically, it is only through starting his own relationship with Marian, and thereby from one 
perspective betraying Fiona, that Grant is able to show his faithfulness. The plot rewards him 
for his choice, ending with a scene where Fiona loses interest in Aubrey, recovers her health, 
realises that her clothes had been mixed up, and expresses her gratitude to Grant. The 
fictionality of AFH, as opposed to Iris, means that the narrative can follow a trajectory that 
apparently restores equilibrium. Although the ironies and uncertainties of this scene make it 
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somewhat ambiguous, she nevertheless appears to validate his decision to let her forge new 
relationships by suddenly restoring value to their old one. As she points out, Grant has not 
abandoned her; left unsaid is that neither has he forced her to remain someone she no longer 
was for his own sake. 
 
Despite this moment of narrative resolution, the viewer is left to wonder whether this startling 
recovery will last and what will now happen between the characters. The structurally parallel 
climactic scene in Iris is quickly followed by Iris’ entry to residential care and death, but 
Polley is content to leave the conclusion of AFH open-ended, in defiance of the archetypal 
representation of progressive decline and death in dementia-related works.16, 35 Shortly 
before, Marian had commented that: 
Sometimes you have to make a decision to be happy. […]The only thing that 
separates one kind of person from the other, is that there are some who stay angry 
about it, and there are some who accept what comes their way. […] I was pretty damn 
mad, but right now, looking at what came my way … I think maybe I could become 
the other kind of person. [1:31:27] 
This kind of flexibility in response to what life holds in store echoes something of the 
decisions that Grant has made over the course of the film to prioritise Fiona’s present 
happiness over her self-continuity. It also perhaps sheds light on a puzzling moment at the 
outset of both the short story and the film, as Fiona’s habit of leaving labels around the house 
to help her remember the names of things brings to mind a tale about German military patrol 
dogs in Czechoslovakia during the War [07:46]. Asked by the Czechs why each dog wore a 
sign saying Hund, the Germans simply replied, “Because that is a Hund.” One interpretation 
of this rather ambiguous episode might be that it points to the arbitrariness of names, and by 
extension, the arbitrariness of labelling or defining people. Signifiers such as these signs or 
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Fiona’s notes do not quite manage to keep definitions stable, just as wisdom for Grant lies in 
not holding Fiona to a stable identity; as he put it only moments before, it may be that “all the 
labels […] are defeating the purpose” [07:13].  
 
CONCLUSION 
In both films, carers struggle to know what the right thing to do is, and the viewer is drawn 
into their dilemmas. As so often happens in questions of care and relationships, there is no 
single right answer, but by opening up the questions, these works provide a corrective to the 
too ready assumption that continuity of identity in the person with dementia must always be 
the primary value for their carers. They remind us that, while life lasts, identity is never 
settled or firm. Among the elements that reinforce this message is the use made by both 
directors of motifs drawn from nature that both bookend and recur through the films: in Iris, 
water; in AFH, snow. In remarkably parallel treatments, at times both the water and the snow 
threaten serious dangers to Iris [37:05, 01:02:22] and Fiona [14:41] respectively, but at other 
moments provide the opportunity for enjoyment of swimming or skiing [e.g., Iris 02:17, 
36:58; AFH 00:55], resisting any univocal interpretation of their meaning. This very 
unsettledness allows the films to imbue these natural elements with symbolic resonance with 
the transitions that the two women find themselves undergoing. Iris explicitly references the 
transformative associations of water as a fluid, formless and changeable medium through the 
invocation of Proteus, whose domain it was and whose transformations are identified with 
those of Iris herself. The river is thus a particularly potent setting in which to highlight 
visually the transitions between solitude and companionship [e.g., 01:34], pleasure and 
danger, youth and age [37:04], and life and death [01:23:46]. In AFH, Grant’s and Fiona’s ski 
tracks in the snow punctuate the whiteness, but at different times in the film go in parallel 
[09:30, 01:41:07], separate from each other and form single tracks [01:26, 14:41], or are 
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covered over by the uniform mantle of further snowfall [42:46, 01:19:55], much as the couple 
move through different phases in their relationship and different levels of closeness. These 
natural features both mirror the changes in the characters’ identities and force them to 
confront them.   
 
It is often the case that the most appropriate response in dementia for the person who has it, 
the carer, or both, is to work at preserving those aspects of identity and selfhood that have 
meant the most to them over time. However, it should be recognised that living with 
dementia does not exclude opportunities for change and potentially even growth; identity 
maintenance should not come with a commitment to stability that might, under other 
circumstances, be seen as stagnation. By communicating this in their different ways – Grant 
by what he does, John by what he does not do – these films offer insight into the everyday 
decisions, from small to large, that make up the day of both carer and the person with 
dementia. They bring these questions with them into the cultural imaginary of dementia, 
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